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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PlRST 8~CURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N A'rIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

C. LUNDAHL, INC., E. CORD~LL LUNDAHL, SHYRLEEN B.
LFNDAHL, EZRA C. LUNDAHL and
LEATHA A. LUNDAHL,
Defendants and Appellants.
r~ZRA

Civil No.
11359

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
~n,ATKMENT

OF 'rHE NATURE OF THE CASE

This artion was commenced by plaintiff bank to
rrrover from its customer the amount of an overdraft
<'rf'ated hy a charge-back of a foreign check which waa

i'Pnt for collection but returned unpaid by the payor
bank. with a counterclaim by the customer growing out
of a prior transaction.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COFR'r
After trial before Honorable Lewi a ,Jones, District
.Judge, sitting with a jury, special interrogatories were
returned with findings against plaintiff on some of the
iHHUes. Tlw court made its own findings on remaining

issues. of fact and law, and rendered judgrnent for plaintiff with an off set for a judgment in favor of defendant>
on their counterelairn.
RI<~LIKF'

ROPCJ HT ON APPB~AL

Defendants seek rever~al of the judgment granted
to plaintiff against defendants.
S1'ATEMF,NT' OF FAC1'S

Plaintiff agrees with tnost of the facts stated in
appellant's brief but adds the following statements controverting or clarifying appellants' statement.
The check of Heathfield F~quipment, Ltd. m the
amount of $8,121.88 deposited by Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc.
on July 28, 1966, (sometimes referred to as Check One)
was charged-hack to the account on August 1, 1966, (Exhibit D-17) and in accordance with the usual practice,
notice thereoff was sent to Lundahls' accountants, but
it was denied that the accountants or Lundahls had
notice of the return of said check until after the monthly
bank statement was recif•ved (1'r. 4~J. 50). Thereafter,
the Bank collected from Lunclahls the amount of the
overdraft created hy that eharge-baC'k. On the initial
deposit of said item, it was not dPsignated as a "foreign
ite1r1" Pven though it waR ctrawn on the Royal Bank of
Canada, as a result of which it was returned with instructions to enter it for collection ( Exhihit D-17 and
Tr. 449). ThP jury detPrrni1wd that tlw Bank was neg-

l!g-ent on that check when it failed to identify it as a
foreign item, and further when it failed to notify Lundalils about the overdraft caused by the loss of the first
1·heek (Rec. 44). On this basis, judgment was entered
on tile counterclaim against plaintiff in the amount of
$8~rl.!l3.

~uhsequentl>·,

another check waa obtained from

Jleatlifield Equipment, Ltd. in the amount of $8,100.00
whieh was received November 15, 1966, but postdated
bef'ause the money was not yet available (Exhibit P-4).
The che('k was deposited December 5, 1966. with thP
specific notation that it was for collection only (Exhibits P-11 and P-3). A credit was givPn to the account
of

J<~zra

P-:-n.

C. Lundahl, Inc. with plaintiff Rank ( I,~xllihit

T11is check is sometimes called Check Two. Said

check was drawn on the Royal Bank of Canada, Kanloops. R.C. and by lPtter of December 9, 1966. said bank
advi ...;ed plaintiff that thP check was dishonored for nonsuffi('ient funds but that tlw check would be held for
pa:·111pnt unless otherwise irn;;tructed. The Bank subsPqnPntl:· notified Lundahls of the dishonor of the check
( Fin<ling No. 8 an<l 'rr. 21. 22), although the jury deh·n11ined that the noticP of dishonor was not given within thP tirnP prescribed hy law (Rec. 44). This Second
Ch<>ek is reall~· thf' onl>· issue on appeal.
On F'ehrna r:· 1:~. 1967, while the eheck wa.s still
hPin_g IH·ld for eollPetion at the Ro:val Bank in Canada,

l<~zra C. Lundahl, realizing that the <'.llP('k in ( 'anada

had not )·et been paid. withdrew $7,000.00 from tl!f,
<·orporate aeeount heeaw'<' lie didn't want tl1\• plaintin
Bank "to glom onto" thP rnone)· (Tr. 20(), Exhibit t+
and Finding No. 12, Rec 71). Tl1e eh eek was tht>reaftPr
returned unpaid and reeeivPd hy plaintiff Fehrnar:· Ju,
1967 (Exhibit P-10). ·while the elH='<·k was pernling for
collection, the Lundahls knew or should have kn01rn
ofthefinaneiall.\· insolvent eondition of H<>athfield Eqllipment, Ltd. and the unavailability of

lllOJH:')"

to pay the

eheck rrr. 297 and Finding No. !), Rec. 69). Lundahl~
had requested the Bank to maintain tl1e cheek in Canada
so that it could be paid \vhen funds were available for
collection (Finding No. 9, ReC'. 70). Iim11ediatel)· upon
receipt of the unpaid (']WC'k, plaintiff attempted to

('Oil

tact the Lundahls and on F't'IJruar:· 17th, advised Cordell Lundahl of the return of the C'heC'k err. 32). Tlw
actual chage-back was entered on the next husim='ss da\·.
l\fonday, February 20. 19G7 (Tr.
Oth(-•J" relavant l"ads an·

:w

and B~xhihit P-12)

~-dnted

in argument.

J>OIXT I

Tl1e plaintiff hank was t lit' agt•11t of the ensto111er
Lundahl and granted a provisional nedit 011 Jk
eernhcr ;), 19GG, whieh did not become final.
POINT II
A provisional credit is suhjPd to a <'ltargP-haek ll\
tliP d0positary hank if tliP d1Pck is dishonored Ill
th" pa~·o1-.

,\. The right to charge-back is not affected by
prior use of funds available from the provisional credit.

H. An.v negligence of the bank is no bar to the
hank's right of charge-hack.

l'<JL\T III
'L'h(' provision.:; of the commercial code covering
hank collections do not apply in cases of unjust enriclnnent.

l'Ofl\T TY
The court did not preclude itself from making the
fin al decision in the case, not only as to the law,
hut as to facts not passed upon by the jury.

POINTY
The accord and satisfaction on January 4, 1967,
did not include Check Two.
ARGr:~fENT

POINT I
THE PLAINTIFF RANK 'VAS THE AGENT
OF THE CUSTOMER LUNDAHL AND GRANTED
A J>RO\TIRIONAL CREDIT ON DECEMBER 5, 1966,
\\'HIC'll DID NOT RECOMI~ FINAL.
l 'nder the Fniform Commercial Code. which has
hPen in effect in the Rtate of Ptah for three years, the
IPgal :'ltatus of hanks and other parties in hanking tran:-;aetions is clarified by the use of specific descriptive
t<Tminolog>·· (Fnless otherwise specified herein, all
statutor>· references are to Ptah Code Anno., 1953 as
amended) Tn the ease at bar, First 8ecnrity Rank of

()

l'tah. N.A. occu1nes the position of "depositar.'· bank"
hecause it is the first hank to which the $8,100.00 elit>('k
in question was transferred for collection (Section 70,\
'

4-105 (a)) .. This bank is also the "collecting bank" because it handled the item for collection (Section 70.\--l105 ( d)) and expected remittance in payment of the
item from the "payor bank", the Royal Bank of Canada
(Section 70A-4-10;) (b)). Appellant Ezra C. Lundahl,
Inc. is the "customer" having the account with the
Bank and for whom the Bank agreed to collect the

itl-111

(Section 70A-4-104 ( e)). Of eonsiderable initial importance are the following provisions of Seetion 70A-

4-201 (1):
( 1) l-nless a contrar~- intent elearl:·; ap1war:-:
and prior to the ti11w that a settlement giwn h~·
a collecting bank for an item is, or becomes final
( suh-seetion ( 3) of seetion 70.A-4-211 and sedion:-;
70A-4-212 and 70A-4-21:3) the hank is an a'!,·enf
or suhagent of the owner of the item and nn~·
settlement given for the itPm is provisional. Tliil'
provision applies regardless of the form of indor;.;ement or lark of irnlorsPment and even though
eredit given for tlw itern is snhjeet to immediate
withdrawel as of right or is in faet withdrawn: ...
A prominent <·0111rne11tator ha:-: expressrrl it
in this rnannPr:
<'ollrding hank:-:. \\·l1Ptllf•r the first, strietl~
an inten11edia1">· or the prPsPnting hank, arP agents of tl10 owner of an item Their responsihilit~
i:-; to aet in the customer':-; lwhalf: thev urnlertakl'
no liahilit.'' as owners tliPmselves ( S;•etion 4-201
(1) ) .

7

A hank may become an owner where this is
the clear intent of the parties and the endorsement permits such ownership. See Section 4-201
( 1 ) , ( 2). This is the exception and not the rule.
Thus, risk of loss of the item and of bank insolvem·>· is on the owner and federal deposit insurance recovery is measured by his, not the
eollecting bank's, rights. Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Commentary, Vol. 4, Section 43.03.
Respondent submits that by reason of the legal
.-;tatus of the hank as the collecting agent for the customer, any credit given to the customer's account is
''provisional", or revocable if any final payment is
not received. The right of the bank to charge-back a
returned and unpaid item is made clear throughout
the entire rniform Commercial Code, and indeed throughout the common law in effect prior to adoption
of the Code. Commercial requirements of the banking
ronmrnnity dictate that a customer for whom collection
is intended bears the risk of loss if the deposited item
is returned unpaid b>· the pa:vor bank. Any loss from
non-pa~·ment must be assumed hy the principal, not the
agPnt This well-established concept of agency in the
<'ontext ot' a banking transaction clearly supports respondent's reasoning that the first credit given by the
dPpositary hank to the customer is a pro1·isional credit.
Tlw statute above cited requires such result. Being provisional. the eredit is subject to a charge-back in the
PYPnt the item is unpaid and is suhjeet to becoming

~

final in the event tlie depositary bank re('eiV('S rP111ittan('e
rn payment of the item.
'rranslated into the fads of this case, it is
disce.rned that the check of Heathfield

ea~il>·

J1~quiprnent, Ltd.

dated DecPrnher 5, 1966, in the arnonnt of $R,100.00 ( J<:xhibit No. P-11) is the item which was deposited. 11hr
reven;e side of that check quite rPgularly and unqnestionably indicates by the ink starnperl endorsement of
the Bank that it was "for colleetion on I:·". The deposit
slip hearing the same date and referring to said item
(Exhibit P-3) also states that it was for "eash eollP<'tion ". It is thus established that the hank was acting
onl:· for and on behalf of its custornPr

l1~zra

C. Lundahl.

Inc. in granting a provisional ('!'edit, with no

liahilit~·

for thP item otl1er than tlw responsihilit:· to use ordin-

ar:· earp (Section 70A-4-202). The provisional na turP
of tl1P ('redit is furtl1er definP<l in tlw contract hetwPPll
the parties (account signaturP card Exhibit P-1) wl1i(']1
provides ;o;pecificall:· tliat tl1P Bank acts onl» as ag-ent

for the customer witl1 tlw n•spon.sibility of exereisingdm, care, and that all itPllls arP <'rPditPd suhjPd to final
pavrnent in <·asl1 or solvent <·redit.
The crPdit was not availahl<' for withdrawal as of
right JwcansP tlw sPttle111<>nt liad not vet l>Pcome final
(Section /OA-4-21:-1 ( .+))

K evertl1Plt>ss, the amount of

the eredit was at least partiall.\ withdrawn on Febrnary

1::3. 19fi7 (Tr. 20(i and

1~~xhihit

14). This faetnal strn<'-

9
tun~

is eonsonant with those portions of Section 70A-

.f-201 providing far agency of the bank and a provis-

ional eredi t even though the credit "is in fact with<lra wn ". as well as being consonant with Section 70A.f-212 ( 4) (a) declaring that "The right to charge-back

is not affected by (a) prior use of the credit given for
the item;" .... Notwithstanding the clarity of the statutes and the smooth accommodation thereto of the facts
of this case, Appellant has labored an argument to the

pffeet that the provisional credit became final because
of a delay on the part of the bank. No statutory pro-

r ision ur legal decision can be cited to support such
position. Indeed, the Code sets forth the only conditions

under which a provisional settlement may become final:
Section 70A-4-213 ( 1) An item is finally
paid by a payor hank when the bank has <lone
an~- of thf' following, whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash; or

( h) settled for the item without reserving
a right to revoke the settlement ... :or
( <') eornplPted thf' process of posting the
item to the indicated account of the drawer, .. . ; or
( <l) made a provisional settlement for the
item and failed to revoke the settlement in the
time and manner pf>rrnitted by statute, clearinghouse rulf' or agTeement.

(2) If provisional settlement for an item
between the presenting and payor hanks is made
through a clearinghouse or b~- debits, or credits
in an aceount hetwef'n thf'm, tlwn to tlw f'xtent

I0

that prnvi::;ional delJit::; or credits for the itett 1
are entered in arcounts between the presentingand pa:-or hank:,; or between the presenting and
successive prior collecting hanks seriatim, t litiy
become final upon final payment of the item Ji~
the payor bank.

03) If a collrctin9 bank recei1,es a settlement
for an item which is or becomes final ( suhseetion ( 3) of section 70A-4-211, subsection ( 2) of
section 70A-4-213) the bank is accountable to it8
customer for the amount of the item and any
pro1:isio11al credit gi1·en for the item in an account
/('ith its customer becom.es final.

( 4) Subject to any right of the bank to apply
the credit to an obligation of the customer, credit
given h:- a hank for an item in an account with
its cirntorner become:,; available for withdrawal
as of right.
(a) in any case wl1ere the bank has received
a provisional settle1rn•nt for the item, - wlwn
such settlement hecm11es final and the hank has
had a reaf'onahle time to learn that the settle11wnt
is final;
(h) in an:- case where the bank is both o depositary bank and a payor bank and the item i:finally paid. - at the opening of the bank's second hanking day follffwinp: reeeipt of the item.
(Emphasis added)
rnder tlw facts of the ease at bar it cannot be
denied that none> of the conditions spe('ified above as
creating· a final settlement ha:,; ocenred. The consequences of the delay of the collecting bank, if any, do not
give rise to any final settfrmP11t of a provisional cre<lit

11

for an item which is never paid!
ln further support of the notion that the December
5, 19titi check was not finally paid, the following comrnen ts are of interest:
'' 'rhe concept of final payment is central
to the scheme of Article 4 because the time of
final payment of a check or similar item is the
starting point for determining the rights and
obligations of a number of parties in relation
to an item. When final payment occurs, the payor bank is deemed to be accountable to the presenting party for the amount of the item. At
the same time the drawer of the instrument is
relieved of liability to the holder because the
amount is deemed to have been paid. Ah;o, if the
payor bank becomes insolvent and suspends payment once final payment has occured, the owner
ol' an item will have a preferred claim against
the payor bank for the amount. Final payment,
lutherrnore, is one of the occurrences which can
prevent the ''four legals'' - notice, stop-order,
legal process and setoff - from heing effective
to prevent actual payment of the item. Provisional settlement, the credit given by the payor
hank to the party presenting an item for collection, becomes final when final payment is made,
as does credit for the item between the presenting hank, other collerting hanks and the customer seeking payment for the item. Final payment, moreover, marks the end of the collection
process and thP beginning of the remitting process, whereby the amount of the item is returned
to the party demanding payment." (Note, Rank
Procedures and the FCC - When iR a check
final1y paid?, Roston Col1ege Tndnstrial Corn-

1:2

mercial Law Heview, \'olume TX, Nm11lwr 4,
Page 9fi7 )
None of the legal consequences described in the
above practical analysis of the effect of final settlement ever existed in the transaction here involved.
Lundahl simply has no basis whatever for asserting
that the check was finally settled.
An interesting judicial decision which supports
respondent's position by analog:- is West Side Bank
vs. Marine National E.rchange Bank, 37 Wis. 2d 661,
155 N.\:V. 2d 587 (1968). There the court was concerned
with the question of final settlement of the check by
reason of the "completed posting" provision of Section
4-213 (1) (c) and Section 4-109. The payor bank stamped
the check "paid", charged the drawers account, photographed, cancelled and filed the item in the drawers
account. Hours later, the drawer issued a stop-paymentorder after which the pa:'or hank withdrew the check
from its files, reversed all the entries and returned
the check to the collecting hank through the ClearingHouse. The collecting bank argued, of course, that
the check' had been "paid" because of the final posting,
and the return of the eheck was unwarranted. The court
held that the pa_vor hank was not accountable for the
item llecanse the process of posting was not complete
until a derision was made that entries would not lw
reversed or corrected, and this decision need not be
made until the time to return an item has expired, i.e.

l~

tl1t> midnight deadline of the next business day.

Respondent herein believes that the liberality of
the court in permitting return of an unpaid check, and
the consequent rights of charge-back to the customer's
account at the collecting bank, is an essential extention
of the commercial requirements whereby collecting bank
is merely on agent of the depositor and assumes no
risk of loss.

POINT II
A PROVISION AL CREDIT IS SUBJECT TO A
CHARGE-BACK BY THE DEPOSITARY BANK IF
THE CHECK IS DISHONORED BY THE PAYOR.
A. rrHE RIGHT TO CHARGE-BACK IS NOT
AFFECTED BY PRIOR USE OF FUNDS
AVAILABLE FROM THE PROVISIONAL
CREDIT.
Yiewed against the foregoing background of agency
and provisional credits, the statutory right of chargeback fits directly into the pattern. Section 70A-4-212
provides in pertinent parti;:
'' ( 1) If a collecting bank has made pro vis-

i onal settlement with its customer for an item
and itself fails by reason of dishonor, suspem~ion
of payments b?J a bank or otherwise to receive
a settlement for the item which is or becomes
final, the bank may revoke the settlement qiven
by it, charge-back the amoimt of any cn'dit gitien
for the item to its customer's account or obtain
refund from its customer wheteher or not it is
able to return the items if bv its midnight a~ad-

1-t

line or within a longer rea::;onable time al'tior it
learns the facts it returns the item or sends notification of the facts. 'l1hese rights to revokP,
charge-back and obtain refund terminate if and
when a settlement for the item received hv the
bank is or becomes final (subsection ( 3) of section 70A-4-211 and subsections (2) and
of
section 70A-4-213).

on

by

or,

( 4) Tl1e ri97it to charge-back is not affectfrl
(a) prior u:•e of th~ credit .r1in'.n for the item;

(h) failure by an~· hank to exercise ordinary
eare with respect to the item hut any hank so
failing remains liahle." (Emphasis added)
There is no question whatever that the hank made
a provisional settlement on December 5, 1966, and that
it failed by reason of dishonor to receive a final settlement for the item from tlie payor bank (Finding No.
7, Rec. 70). Therefore, the hank had the clear right to
charge back to the customer's account the amount of
credit previously given for the item when it was finally
returned nnpaid in Fehruan·. 1967.
Of critical importance to the issues before this court
is the plain statuton· rnle that the right to charge back
is not affected h~- prior use of the credit given for the
itern or failure of the hank to Pxercise ordinary care
with res1wd to the item. 'Vith regard to the last stated
provision, it appears clear that the defendants claimed
no damages with respect to the $8,100 00 of DecemhN

l;)

:>, 1966, a::; a re.sult of which no issue exists with respect
thereto. We are left with two issues under the provisions
of 70A-4-212: ( 1) The effect of the prior use of the
credit given for the item by reason of the withdrawal
by the Lundahls of $7 ,000.00 on February 13, 1967;

and (2) failure of the bank to exercise ordinary care
with respect to that particular item.
:Much discussion is entertained in appellant's brief
regarding the difference between the right of refund
and the right of charge back. Respondent submits that
all of such argument is meaningless under the proper
interpretation of governing law as applied to the facts
of this case. The very wording of Section 70A-4-212 ( 4)
(a) grants the right of charge-back notwithstanding
prior use of credit given for the item. Appellant Ezra
C. Lundahl. Inc. made prior use of part of the credit
givPn for the item by its withdrawal of $7,000.00 on
February 13, 1967. Such use does not affect the Bank's
right to charge-back the returned check one week later
after it had received unpaid from the payor bank. Appellant',;;: attempt to characterize this transaction as a "refund'' has no real relevance to the case by reason of
that :-;tatutory wording.
Highlighting the distinction between "charge-back"
and ''refund'' we bring to the court's attention the very
definition of a "customer" which includes a person
l1aving an account with a hank, as in the case here, as

1()

well as a penson "tor w horn a hank has agreed to collPi:>t
items" (Section 70A-4-10-1- (1) ( e)). A hank seeking
a refund against a customer would include a bank whieh
cashed a check or otherwise extended credit for a collec-

tion item to someone not utilizing an account with the
hank, but who is a "customer" nevertheless because
the Lank agreed to effect collection of the item for him.
Tn such case, the bank would clearly have no right to
charge-back a returned item to any account. This is
distinguishable from the case at bar where the defendant Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc. maintained an account and
the right of charge-back was not affected by the fact
that a substantial portion of the money was withdrawn
from the account prior to the date of charge-back. The
overdraft thus created ·which forms the basis of plaintiff's complaint is still a very different kind of transaction than obtaining a refund from a non-account-holding
'' custo111er'' who utilized no account which might be
subject to the charge-hack. This Court will not be confused by appellant's attempt to complicate a statutory
provision which is simple in the wording of Section
70.-\-4-212 (4) (a).
Tli<> following e011m1ents from Anderson's P niforrn
C01rn11erC'ial Code, Yolurne 2, rna:< he helpfuJ.
The right to eharge-hack or obtain a refund
from its custolller is a emnulative or additional
remedy of the eollecting bank. The fact that it
fails to exen·is0 snrh right, or fails to do so
within the time reqnirt><l hy tlw rode, is imrna-
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terial with respect to and does not affect any
other right which it has against the customer
or any other person. (Anderson, Section 4-212 :3)
'11he right of the collecting bank to charge
back is not affected by the circumstances that
the customer has made a prior use of the credit
given for the item. Nor is it affected by the fact
any bank in the chain of collection, including
even the depositary bank, failed to exercise ordinary care with respect fo the item. Conversely,
any bank which has been negligent remains liable for its negligence and such liability is not
affected by the existence of the right of chargehack.
When a customer's bank has permitted the
customer to withdraw the amount of the credit
given for a deposited check, the bank may charge
hack against the depositor's account the amoant
of such check if because of the drawer's stopping
payment thereof, the customer's bank is not able
to collect the eheck. Pazol 11. Citizens Nati< 1nal
Bank, 110 Ga. App. 319, 138 S.E. 2d 442. t' Anderson, Section 4-212 :5)

B. ANY NEGLIGENCE OF THE BANK IS NO
BAR TO THE BANK'S RIGHT OF CHARGF,-BACK.
In response to the Court's special interrog-atories
which rovered some of the issues in the case, the jury
detPrmined that the Bank was negligent in not notifying
Lundahl of the nonpayment of the December 5th check
in the time prescribed hy law (Rec. 44). Reference is
made to Exhibit P-6 wherein the Royal Bank of Canada
;;pecifieall~' advised First Serurity Bank that the rheck

18
would continue to lw held for JH:t)rrnent. H iR also clearh
made a finding that the Hank did keep the Lundahl~
advised of the status of the check at the Royal Bank
of Canada and of it:< nonpayment (Findings No. 8).
'T'he latter finding is ampl)· supported by evidence. An
officer of the Bank testified of numerous occasions
in which the status of the unpaid check was discnssed
with the Lundahls (Tr. 21, 22).
In the appellant's brief it is claimed that the lower
court did not understand the impact of its findings,
for a contradiction in terms is claimed. Apparently,
the argument is that because the jury found that the
Bank did not give notice of the dishonor of the check
on December 9th when gxhibit P-6 was received. or
within tht> midnight deadline thereafter, then any further notice given by the Bank should not be counted.
8ueh an argument is clearl>· untenable. Section 70A-4212 (-!-) (b) clearl)· states that the right to chage-hack

is not aff eeted by failure of the hank to exercise ordinary care, In Comment 5 to the section from the 1962
official text of the National Conference of Commissioner::-; on lTniforrn State Law::-;, we quote:
";). ThP rule of :,;nh:,;edion ( 4) relating to
charge-haek (as disti.nguisliPd from claim for
refnncl) appliPs i nespPdive of the cause of the
nm1pn>·111ent, and of tile person ultimately liable
for nonpay1rn•nt. Thus, eharge-baek is permitted
even \d1ere nonpa>·rnent results from the depositar» hank':.; own lH',!.digenee. ,\n>· other rnl0

U)

would re~;ult in litigation based upon a crnm1
for wrongful dishonor of other checks of the
('Ustorner, with potential damages far in exces.s
of the amount of the item. An~' other rule would
require a hank to determine difficult questions
of fact. The customer's protection is found in
the general obligation of good faith (Sections
1-203 and 4-103). If bad faith is established the
customer's recovery "includes other damages, if
any, suffrred by the party as a proximate consequence" (Rection 4-103 (;)): see also Section
4-402)."
Respondent submits that the lower court's findings
herein that the Bank kept Lundahl fully informed as
to the status of the check goes directly to the question
of ''good faith'' of the Bank. The customer is protected
in the right of charge-hack notwithstanding negligence
of the h:mk because the hank is still the agent of the
customer and if the hank acts in good faith, it has the
unconditional riglit to eharge-back an unpaid check,
and thus reverse tl1e proYisional credit Indeed, the
µ:ood faith of the customer is hroug-ht into question
wh<>n the eourt specificall~' coneluded that "the customer kne\Y or should have known that the drawer of
the check was in unsound financial straits and either
insolyent or on the verge of insolvency." (Rec. 73, Condusion No. 2). We also observe that the testimony of
~Ir. Heathfield to the effect that the Bank could have
paid the check in question is totally meaningless in
\'iPw of the fart that the Royal Bank of Canada held
tl1P rlwck for the specific purpose of obtaining na~'-

'..?O
rnent thereon, and after the check was returned unpaid
by letter of Februar>' 10, 1967, (Exhibit P-10) the Royal
Bank subsequently explained that Heathfield was
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no financial condition to pay the check at any Erne dming the period it had been held (Exhibit P-28).
At Page 41 of appellant's brief, the case of Rock
Island Auction Sales Inc. vs. Empire Packing Company,

32 Ill. 2d 269~ 204 N.:BJ. 2d 721, 18 ALR 3d 1368 (1963)
is discussed, but appellant misconstrues the impact of
that decision. In that case, the PWlJOr bank held a check
beyond its midnight deadline because its depositor, the
drawer of the check, assured the bank that funds would
be deposited to cover the item Such is precisely the
case here with the Royal Bank of Canada. The Illinois
Supreme Court, however, specifically stated that the
collecting bank is in a different legal status:
" .... Depositar~· and collecting banks art
primarily as conduits. '1'he steps that they take
can only indir0ctly affect the determination of
whether or not a check is to be paid, which is the
focal point in the collection process. 'rhe legislahue could haYe eoncluded that the failure ol'
such a bank to meet its deadline would most frequently be the resnlt of negligence, and fixed
liabilit>- accordingly. TliP rolP of a payor hank
in tl1P rnflprtio11 J!rocess, on fhf other hand. ;,
crvrial. It knmrs ll'hetlier or not the drawer has
funds arailah!P to pa11 flip item. 'rhe legislature
could have considered tl1at the failure of s11cl1
a hank to meet its dea<lline is likel>· to be <lue
to fartors other tlian neg-ligence, and that the
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relationship between a payor hank and it::; customer may so influence its conduct as to cause
a conscious disregard of its statutory duty. 'rhe
pn·sent ease is illustrative. The defendant, in
its position as a payor bank, deliberately aligned
itself with its customer in order to protect that
eustorner's credit and consciously disregarded
tlw dnt.'· imposed upon it " (Emphasis added)
We are not concerned in this action, unfortunately,
with a elaim for relief against the Royal Bank of Canada. 'rliat hank's action was crucial. First Security
Hank, on the other hand, acted in good faith and did
not take or omit any action which was detrimental to
tlw interests of Lundahl.
B.'' reason of all of the foregoing considerations,
n•sporn!ent Bank herein was clearly entitled to chargehaC'k tl1e returned item of $8,100.00 in February, 1967,
and to recover from Lundahl the amount of the overdraft neated thereh.''·

POIN'r TTI
PROVISIONR OF THE COMMERCIAL
CODI-<~ COVERING BANK COLLECTIONS DO NOT
A PPPLY lN CASER OF FN.TFST ENRICHMENT.
TH~~

ARGFl\fENT
The lower court made a specifiC' finding- that Lun<lnlil had been and would continue in the future to be
m1ju..;tl.'' enriched unless compelled to make repayment
to tl1P hank on the $8,100.00 C'heck for which it had re-
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ceived credit from Plaintiff and used the rnonev therefrom, but which check was never honored or paid h>
either the drawee or drawer. (Finding of Fact 11)
In other words, if Lundahl were allowed to keep the
full $8,J 00.00 which Plaintiff had kindly advanced
to Lundahl on the basis of the anticipated collection
of the $8,100.00 check, but which in fact was nc~ver
collected, Lundahl would be unjustly enriched at the
expense of Plaintiff, who had come to Lundahl's aid
and assistance.
Based on this finding, the lower court concluded
that the provisions of the Commercial Code are not
applicable where the bank customer solicits the aid
and assistance of the bank in securing and collecting
a post-dated replacement check issued to cover a prior
lost check, where the customer knew or should have
known that the issuer of the check was in unsound
financial straits and either insolvent or on the verge
of insolvenc:·. (Conclusion of Law 2, R. 73)
'rhe Commercial Code recognizes situations where
the technical provisions of the Code should not apply.
Section 70A-4-212, UCA, 1953 Replacement, Right of
Charge-back or Refund, Suhsection ( 5) provides:
" ( 5) A failure to charge-hack or claim refund does not affect other rights of the bank
agaim;t the customer or any other party.''
This iR all in accord with the basic. fundamental
rule of Restitution:

2d·>
American Law Institute, Restatement of the
Law, Restitution:
"Section 1. Unjust Enrichment.
A pernon who has been unjustly enriched
at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other."
''Comment:
a. A penson is enriched if he has received
a benefit (see Comment b). A person is unjustly
enriched if the retention of the benefit would be
nnjust. A person obtains restitution when he
i~ restored to the position he formerly occupied
either by the return of something which he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in
mone?. Ordinarily, the measure of restitution is
1he amount of enrichment received, hut as stated
in Comment e, if the loss suffered differs from
tl1e amount of benefit received, the measure of
restitution may be more or less than the loss
:-:nffered or more or less than the enrfrlnncnt.
h. vVhat ronstitutes a benefit . .\ '>rrson ronfers a benefit upon another if hf' gives to the
other possession of or some other intere:-;t in
111one>-, land, chattel~. or ehoses in aetion, performs :-;ervice:-; henefi.eial to or at the request of
the other, or in any wa>- adds to the other's securit>- or advantage He confers a benefit not onl.11
u·here lie adds to the property of another, but
also u hPre he sa1 es flu? other from P.r:pense or
loss. The word "benefit" therefore. denotes any
1

1

form of advantage. The advantag-e for which a
person ordinarily rnu:-;t pa~r is pernnian- advjintage: it is not, however, neres:-;arih- so limited,
as where a physician attends an insensible ner:-:on wl10 is save<l snhseqnent pnin or ·who receives

2-t

thereby a greater chance of living.''
Section -1. Remedies :
In situations in which a person i8 entitlPd
to restitution, he is entitled, in an appropriatp
case, to one or more of the following remedies:
(a) * * * (e)
( f) a judgement at law or decree in equit)·
for the payment of money, directly or b~r wa~
of set-off or counterclaim.

Section fl. Forms of Action.
'rhe appropriate proceedings in an action
at law for the payment of money by way of restitution is:
(a)

* * * (h)

( c) in States whirh have statutes providing
for the abolition of the distinctions between forms
of action, an action in which the facts entitling
the Plaintiff to re.;;titntion are set forth.
The facts of this case support the Court's Finding
and Conclusion. A chronicle of the pertinent facts are:
l. Cheek one was Jost through no fault of the Plain-

tiff hank, hut either in transit or by Lundahl 's agent.
(Finding of Fact 3, R. 74, and jury's Answer to Special
Interrogatory 2, R. 44) which recognizes the loss of
check one, hut makes no finding of negligence against
the hank regarding said loss, thus accepting the bank's
evidence showing a tramanittal of the check one to Lundahl 's agent 'rr. 241-246)
2. A most difficult time was had h>· the Lnndahls

m ;-;p<·unng a replacement check from Heathfield, and
tltP hank, at I,undahl 's request, aided materially in securing the Check Two in place of Check One. (Findings

or

f<'aet 4 and ;J, 1'r. 234-235, and Ex. 18, Letter Bank

to HPathfield,

I<~x.

25 Letter Heathfield to Bank.)

i1. Check rl1wo, when finally issued by Heathfield

to rowr lost Check One, was postdated. (Findings
of Faet 5, R. 69, Ex. 4 Letter of Transmittal from
H rathfield to Lundahl explaining reason for post-dating and Lundahl 's prior knowledge of circumstances.)
4. That during this time and continuing on for the
duration of time herein involved, Heathfield was in
unsound financial condition and its checking account
snh<·et to almost continuous overdraft. That Lundahl
knew of this, or should have been well aware of this.
(Findings of Fad ;) ;

l~~x.

25, which is Heath field's bank

statements for the year 1966: Ex. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9. 10, and 25,
wliieh are all letters; Tr. 158 to 185, inc. the testimony

or

HaJ'\'P\' C'. Heathfield
;l. That between the date, to-wit: Fehruar_'I· 10, 1967

(

l 1~x.

('lt('C'k

10) when the Royal Bank of Canada returned
Two to Plaintiff, and its receipt by Plaintiff on

F'ei>ruar_'I·

rn,

1967, (Tr. 31), Lundahl withdrew the

,;nm of $7,000.00 from its aceount. (Finding of f:i'act
I'.!: Tr. 217-218, 1'r. 222-223) In the depo.-;ition of F~zra

C. Lundahl he refused to answer wh_\' said withdrawal
\\ ns made, then in answer to written interrogatories

:2(;

he gave one rem;on for withdrawing tlte money, and
during testimony at the trial he gave other reasons.
(Findings of Fact 13; Tr. 217-218, Tr. 222-22:1). The
lower Court made a Finding (~umber 13) that sair!
withdrawal was not made in good faith.
6. 1"1hat notwithstanding the assertion of Harvey
G. Heathfield that Heathfield had a continuing line of

credit up to $60,000.00 with the Royal Bank of Canada,
for some unexplained reason the Royal Bank of Canada
did not honor the Second Check even though it held
po3session of said unpaid check for over two months,
thus contributing to the overall picture of bad faith
dealings or arrangements between Lundahls, Heathfields, and Heathfield's hank. (Tr. 172-178, 181-182).
7.

~rhat

the withdrawal of $7,000.00 by Ezra Lun-

dahl from the Corporate account on February 13, !967
was made just a few da:n; before Check Two was returned unpaid leaving insufficient funds in the account
to cover the check when it returned and at a time when
Cordell Lundahl was in Canada and had discussed the
second check with ~~zra Lundahl, all the while profpssinµ: to know nothing about H eathfield 's inabilit~·
to pay it.
Based on the ahovP law and farts. the lower eourt
determined that the technical rnles governing bank
collections were not applieable ..\nd to prevent an unjust
enrichment in favor of Lundahl, ,,·ho aeted in had faith.

27
at the exµen:::;e of the Plaintiff bank, who went out of
its way to assist its customer's attempt to get out of

a sticky matter, only to have the customer turn on the
bank and attempt to "stick" it for the $8,000.00, the
Court allowed Plaintiff to recover its out-of-pocket
(·x1ienditure made to benefit the customer.
rrlie Court ruled that the Plaintiff bank was en-

titled to recover the $8,100.00 it had advanced to Lundahl, less only what it had recouped on the charge-back,
IPss damages as fixed by the jury for its negligence.
In all other respects, the Plaintiff bank gave timely
notice and kept Lundahl fully advised in all respects.
(Findings of Fact 8)
On this theory of restitution alone, to prevent unjust enrichment, Plaintiff is entitled to an affinnance
of the lower courts decision.

POINT IV
BY srBl\II11 TING A SPECIAL YF~RDICT AND
lNTl~JRROGATORIB~S TO THE JURY, THE COERT
D fD NOT PRE CL UDE ITSELF FROM MAKING
'l'Hf1J F1NAL DECISION IN THE CASE. NOT ONLY
AN TO THE LAW, BUT AS TO FACTS NOT PASSl1:n 1'PON BY THE SPRY.
A RO rMEN'l1
Appellant takes the position that the Court, having
snlnnitted the case to the jur~· upon a 8pecial verdict

and interrogatories was thereafter precluded from further participation in the case. Appellant argues that
the jury having an.swered four questions, this disposed
of the lawsuit and that the Court had nothing further
to do but render a general verdict for Defendants.
'rhis view of appellants is not in accord with Rule
49, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Special Verdicts
and Interrogatories.
Rule 49 reads:
RULE 49
SPECIAL YERDICTS AND 1N'L1 ERROGATORIES
(a) Special Verdicts: rrhe court may require
a jury to return only a special verdict in the
form of a special written finding upon each issue
of fact. In the event the Court may submit to
the jury written interrogatories susceptible of
('ategorical or other brief answers or may submit written forms of several special findings
which might properl)- he made under the pleadings and evidence: or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the
written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction eoncerning the matter
thus submitted as ma~- he necessary to enable
the jur.v to make its findings upon each issue.
If in so doing the Court omits any issue of fact
raised by the pleadings or hy the evidence, eacl1
part.\- waives his right to a trial h~- j1u)- of the
issue so omitted unless before the jury retires
he demands its submission to the jury. As to an
issue omitted without such demand the Court
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may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it
shall h<:> deemed to have made a finding in aecord
with the judgment on the special verdict.

R.v the plain terms of this Rule, each party waives
his right to a jury trial on any issue of fact not submitted to the jury. And, as to issue omitted, the Court
ma)· make a finding.
rl'hP Court has control of the case during the trial.
Hanks vs. Christensen, (1960) 11 U. (2d) 8, 354 P(2d)
;)G4. In exercising this control, the Court may submit
the case to 1:1- jury upon: (1) a general verdict; (2) a
-:pecial verdict or interrogatories; or (3) a combinatio;n
of interrogatories with a general verdict. Here, the
Court rhose method (2).
'' '11he function of the special verdict is to
secure a findings from the jury upon each question of ultimate fact litigated as distinguished
from a gene.ral verdict by which the jury find~
upon all the issues '' Hughes Federal Practice,
.J nrisdiction and Procedure, Vol. 18. Section 24302.
page 319.
rtali Rule 49 (a) is modeled from Federal Rule

-Hl (a).
;\nd. at this point, it is well to emphasis a factor
tliat appellant insists on ignoring, which is that in
:-;ptting out in detail, in answer to question 2 submitted
to the jury. just how and in what respects PlaintiffHespondant was negligent, the jury was likewise making
a finding as to no negligence and a proper performance

:m
on the .part of plaintiff-bank m handling the nrnltiplt>
transactions it was rPquPsted to assist defendant-appt>l
lant with in this matter.
An example of this 1s Defendant-Appellant's insistence on claiming, notwithstanding there was no finding by the jury in their favor on this, that the Plaintiff-Respondent lost the first check, did not give notice
to Defendant-Appellant of the charge-back on it and
did not return the check to them. rrhe record is extremely clear on the procedure followed by the bank in returning this check (check one) to Lundahl 's agent and
that the agent receiYed it ,(Tr. 241-246, 256-261, 2el262), and obviously both the Court and the jury elected
to believe this evidence. The jury detailed no finding
of negligence in this respect and the Court specifically
found that check one was either lost in transit rifter
being mailed out, together with a charge-back slip, by
the hank, or lost after receipt by Lundahl 's agent. In
either event. this was no fault of the bank, nor a result
of its failure to act properly.
Quoting further from Hugh es, Y ol. 18, Section

24302, page 320:
'' Bv submission of a special verdict it is
('Ontemplated that the jrn·~- he required to answer
the questions submitted to them upon the evidence and in accordance with the instructions
of the Court. It is no part of the jury's function
to determine what effect its answers will 11ave
upon the final outcome of the trial."

'

~1

In summary. what the Court did here was to ask
tlw jur.v to answer four questions concerning fa<:>tual

mattPrs. 'T'rw Court did not, nor did the parties, reque:-;t a general verdict from the jury. This left the

ultimate decision in the case, together with determination of all factual issues not submitted to the jury,
up to the Court. Actually the Court spelled this out
in submitting the interrogatories to the jury, by telling
them that the Court was going to make the ultimate
derision on the Plaintiff's case and the question of the
guarantee. (Tr. 220, 267-268)
And the Court further spelled out at that time that
there were other questions he could submit to the jury,
hut chose not to. (Tr. 268)
In sl1ort, the Court followed the proper procedure
m making its own findings on omitted issues, and in
applying the law correctl:v to all of the facts as found
h.v the jury Court. That the Court committed no error
in its decision is shown in other phases of this brief.
POINT V
THg ACCORD AND SATISFACTION ON JAN-

l'ARY

+,

1967, DID NO'T' INCLFDE CHECK T\VO.
ARGTTM~~N'T'

The trial court submitted the question of an accord
and sati;;;faction between Plaintiff-Respondant and Det'Pn<lant-A ppellant as of .January 4, 1967, to the jury.

The jury found an accord and satisfaction a:s of
that date, which finding the Court approved and accepted. Finding of Fact 1f'l and 16, and Conclusion ol'
Law l.
The Court found, however, that said accord and
satisfaction made on January 4, 1967, did not include
Check Two, and rightly so. Check Two was not even
returned unpaid to the Plaintiff bank until long after
January 4, 1967, to-wit: on February 16, 1967.
Prior to January 4, 1967, all concerned considered
that Check rrwo would be paid (Tr. 57), and Hesston
Corporation, who entering into a contract (Ex. D-19)
with Lundahl which provided for the payment of Lundahl 's obligation, was so informed. (Tr. 77-79)
It was not until after .Jan nary 4, 1967, and actuall)'

m "B-,ehruary, on or about the 9th or 10th thereof, that
it became apparent that Check Two would not be paid.
It is difficult to see how an accord and satisfaction

ns of one date would cover a liability that was not
made known until a later date. Actually, if DefendantsAppP.llants arguement in this respect is accepted, i.e.:
That Hesston contract applied not only to the items
listed on Exhibits 21 and 23, to-wit: the notes
and contracts then outstanding, hut settled everythinghetween the hank and Lundahl, then it would apply to
the bank accounts held by the Lundahls at that time
with the hank 'vherein a dehtor-ereditor relatiom:hip

:

')')

t)t)

existed, and the bank would be entitled to claim an
amount from the Lundahls totaling the sum of all monP)'S in deposit on said day. The Court excepted the dayto-<la>· bank accounts from the accord and satisfaction
(Conclusion of Law 1) and Lundahl does not quarrel
with this exception, they only want to quarrel with
the exception which hurts them and leave standing the
exception which helps them.
''Accord and satisfaction is a method of diacharging a contract or cause of action, whereby
the parties agree to give and accept something
in settlement of the claim or demand of the one
a1~ainst the other, and perform such agreement,
the ''accord'' being the agreement and the ''satisfaction" is execution or performance." Fair
cl1ild vs. Mathews (Idaho, 1966) 41!5 P (2d) 43.
In Fairchild, the Idaho Supreme Court went
on to say: (Page 46 of 415 P (2d)
constitute an accord and aatisfaction
there must be an offer in full satisfaction of the
obligation accompanied by such acts and declara tiorn~ as amount to a condition that if it is accepted, it is to he in full satisfaction, and the condition must he such that the party to whom the
offer is made is bound to understand that if he
accepts it, he does so snhject to the conditions
inq1osed. ''
"1~0

And further on, at the sanw page:

''In order for the acceptance of a check to
amount to an accord and satisfaction. where it
is for a lesser sum that is claimed b>· the creditor
to be due, the conditions must hr made plain,
drfinitr and certain h~· the <lehtor that he i3

:)-±
g1vmg such che('k in complete settlement anJ
satisfaction of all accounts between him and his
creditor and that acceptance thereof shall clo1'e
the account or tontroversey. Also an accord and
satisfaction cannot arise by reason of the payment of less than is due, unless it clearly appear~
not only that this was the intention of the payor,
but also that the payee expressly agreed to it.
or was bound to know of the intention at the
time of the acceptance; in effect, that his taking
of a check would be tortious except upon the
assumption of a taking in full satisfaction. It
eannot he too strongly stated that an accord and
satisfaction can never he implied from language
of doubtful meaning; indeed. the words themselves deny this pos8ibility. Hence, where a suhstantial doubt arises, there can be no such application, the usual rule applies, and the payment
will be treated as on account only."
Applying this law to the existing facts, it certainly appears that the accord and satisfaction of ,Januar>'
4, 1967 did not and co1.tld not include the Second Check.
Lundahl in one hreath says that the amount of
money paid hy them to the hank on January 4, 1967.
pursuant to the Hesston agreement and Exhibit 21 and
23 discharged their liabilit!- to the bank under Check
'rwo. which was not even mentioned in either of said
F.xhibits, and in the second breath maintain to thi:;
very date that the!- had no knowledge of the Second
Check being unpaid nntil Fehrnan· 10, 1967.
Ohvionsl!-, the two positions are inconsistent, and
m fact,

mntuall~- exclnsin~.

If they made payment of money to the bank on

.January 4) 1D67, in discharge of Check Two, knowledge
of Cheek 1'wo and a "plain, definite and certain" offer
to discharg-e it would be an essential element to include

it in the accord and satisfaction.

1t is impossible to reconcile Lundahl 's position m
this respect.
The Court's Findings and Conclusions hased on

the record and the .Judgment entered thereon should
he upheld.
CONCLUSION
The plain simple facts are that Lundahl wants to
keep thP bank's money. The lower Court refused to
lend its aid to such an unjust enrichment. Respondent
earnest!.'- requests this Court to do likewise, and uphold the trial Courts Findings, Conclusions and .J udgrnent.
Respeetfull.'- Submitted.
Olson and Hoggan

By
Ray, Quinne.'· and N eheker
B.'· ------------------------------------------------------------

Attorne.'·s for Plaintiff-Respondent

